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Assurance for Service Organisations:  
Contextualising Accountability and Trust 
Abstract 
Purpose – A number of organisations outsource their information systems and information 
technology infrastructure to a type of organisation called a “service organisation”. In the current 
business environment, where cyber risks are increasing, it is important to have a mechanism to 
ensure the credibility of these service organisations. This paper, therefore, aims to understand the 
contextualisation of accountability and trust of related organisations through the use of assurance 
engagements.  
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is conceptual in nature; however, textual data 
sources are used to support the theorisation of accountability and trust in the context of 
companies using service organisations. It employs publicly available assurance reports and 
related assurance standards for observing the accountability mechanism in practice, in order to 
understand the purpose of the assurance.   
Findings – Assurance statements for service organisations mainly provide reputation-based, not 
contract-based, accountability. Limited access to the assurance reports and limited responsibility 
of service auditors potentially decrease the degree of this reputation-based accountability. The 
findings reveal a potential accountability paradox regarding the role of assurance practice, as to 
whether it serves as a managerial tool to build trust or as an accountability mechanism for 
stakeholders.       
Originality/value – This paper extends our understanding of accountability and trust in the 
context of this unconventional form of organisational relationship. It urges more transparency in 
terms of the accessibility of assurance reports to provide information to wider stakeholders. The 
findings add to the latent literature on organisational trust and voluntarynon-financial assurance 
practice.    
Keywords – service organisation, non-financialvoluntary assurance, accountability, trust 
Paper type – research paper  
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1. Introduction 
In the current decade, the advancement of information technology has influenced the change in 
how companies store and process all kinds of data, including their business transaction 
information and clients’ personal data. A number of companies have outsourced their 
information technology infrastructure and data storage to organisation, so called ‘service 
organisations’. The term ‘service organisation’ refers to an organisation that provides 
outsourcing services to entities aiming to contain or reduce costs. 
A number of organisations outsource some of their operational functions relating to information 
technology, accounting, customer care, human resources, benefits management, payments and so 
on. This outsourcing can benefit organisations, allowing them to have better operational systems 
and to achieve technological improvement and cost savings. However, the benefits do not come 
without risks. Those risks include lack of compliance with contracts, loss of technical 
knowledge, and potential non-financial costs (Gonzalez et al., 2010), especially risks relating to 
information technology systems.   
This outsourcing activity can affect the operation and internal control of entities if 
adequateinternal controls are not in place in the service organisations. This means service 
organisations are the entity’s supplier, while the entity is a supplier of the end clients/users. This, 
in turn, means service organisations have become instrumental in the quest to fulfil promises to 
entities’ stakeholders along the supply chain.  
For example, a company using cloud computing services needs to make sure that the service 
organisation providing the cloud service has appropriate controls to protect their business, client 
and other types of data. Thus, certification and compliance with regard to information security 
standards, compliance with regulations, and auditing norms have been introduced and may be 
required by the user organisation (Panth et al., 2014). 
It is worth noting the terms relevant to several roles involved in this outsourcing environment.  
User organisation: an entity that has outsourced part of its business to a service 
organisation. 
User auditor: an auditor of the user organisation. 
Service organisation: a provider of a service to a user organisation that is likely to be 
relevant to the user organisation’s internal control. 
Service auditor: an auditor of the service organisation. 
The relationships among these parties challenge the conventional agent-princip l relationship 
and the accountability model that is associated with it. The responsibility of service organisations 
is not clear. Also, unlike financial audit reports that are commissioned by the principal to 
mitigate the potential that the agent is going to serve their own interests, the assurance for a 
service organisation is mainly commissioned by the management of that service organisation. 
This introduces issues of the role of this kind of assurance and issues relating to the interplay 
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between accountability, trust and reputation of user organisations, service organisation, and 
service auditors.   
This paper aims to seek the answer to the question: “What is the purpose of assurance for service 
organisations?” The key question is whether current practice in assurance in service 
organisations is serving to enhance accountability, or is serving other purposes? If it does serve 
accountability, then who are the accountable parties? By adopting the accountability framework 
developed by Swift (2001), this paper highlights the roles of assurance statements for service 
organisations in relation to accountability and trust. It focuses on the purposes of the assurance 
engagement and the communication of the assurance to related stakeholders. The discussion 
from this paper is fundamental to information technology governance and digital trust. This 
could potentially provide a stepping stone to understanding the relevant assurance practices and 
stakeholders’ trust relating to cyber security risks that are prevalent in this business environment 
addressed in this paper.  
This paper is divided into a further five sections. The next section discusses the nature of 
assurance practice for service organisations. The section includes the description of relations 
between related parties, assurance in service organisations as a voluntary non-financial assurance 
practice, and related assurance standards. The conceptual framework is then presented. Next, 
example cases to illustrate the assurance practice and the use of assurance reports are discussed. 
This is followed by discussion of the public disclosure of assurance statements, accountability, 
and stakeholders’ trust. The paper finishes with concluding sections.   
 
2. Service organisations and the assurance practice 
The fast pace of technological evolution, big data technology and standardised business 
processes influence companies in outsourcing some parts of their information systems. 
Although the outsourcing trend has been around for years now, it is still being more widely 
adopted. Outsourcing refers to any task, operation, or process of an organisation that is done by 
a third party, or another service organisation.  
The use of service organisations requires user organisations to better manage their risks 
relating to the outsourced services. The user organisation, therefore, requires a certain degree 
of assurance that the service organisation has well-established internal controls that can be 
aligned with their own internal controls and other requirements. Therefore, user organisations 
and the users’ auditors need to send requirements to service organisations asking for such 
assurance to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of their internal controls. This is where 
assurance practice within service organisations plays an important role as an accountability and 
trust mechanism. Assurance or review of third party service providers, or service organisations, 
can be conducted to satisfy the requirements of user organisations in terms of outsourcing 
contracts and data security. 
Although tasks are outsourced to service organisations, the accountability of user organisations 
cannot really be outsourced. In other words, user organisations are ultimately responsible for 
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their control environment, which is affected by the use of service organisations. This influences 
the increasing demand for control assurance for activities performed by third parties.  
Problems might arise when the process of holding a user organisation accountable to their 
stakeholders involves two sets of control relationships (i.e. 1. user organisation and stakeholders, 
and 2. user organisation and service organisation). The problems are visible in this new form of 
organisational relationship (i.e. outsourcing) (Child and Rodrigues, 2003).  
 
2.1 Relationship between user entity, service organisation, and their 
auditors 
This section aims to illustrate the relationship between different parties involved in outsourcing 
activities and the assurance practice in service organisations. There may be more than one level 
of service organisation, meaning that the service organisation outsources parts of their tasks and 
processes to another service organisation (i.e. subservice organisation). However, in this paper, 
only one level of service organisation is illustrated because the relation between subservice 
organisations with other related parties will be similar to those of the service organisation with 
those parties. Figure 1 shows the relationship between those parties. 
Figure 1: Relationships between service organisations and other entities.   
 
(Adapted from Knolmayer and Asprion (2011)) 
Page 4 of 41Managerial Auditing Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Managerial Auditing Journal
 
The highlighted area in the diagram shows the relationships in a traditional organisational form 
without outsourcing activities. An arrow represents the service flow, starting from the party that 
provides services (including information, and reports) to another party, which is at head of the 
arrow.   
From the diagram shown in Figure 1, it can be seen that there is a service organisation with its 
auditor added to the traditional diagram showing the relationship between agent, principal, and 
auditor. The relationship in the traditional organisational form starts where an (user) organisation 
operates to serve the goals of its shareholders and stakeholders. Due to the assumptions of 
agency theory that management of an organisation will pursue self-interest and that there is 
information asymmetry between the organisation and shareholders, an accountability mechanism 
needs to be implemented. An (user) auditor, having their duty to shareholders, conducts the audit 
of the user organisation’s financial statements, and the auditing practice serves as a mechanism 
to enforce the accountability of the organisation. 
When the picture includes a service organisation, the relationship between related parties 
becomes more complex. The outsourcing of activities means that a user organisation is the direct 
client of a service organisation, and that this service organisation needs to serve the goals of the 
user organisation in the commissioned areas. The question is whether the service organisation is 
also accountable to the shareholders and stakeholders of the user organisation. Due to concern 
about internal controls in service organisations, which may affect the operation of their services, 
a user organisation requires from the service organisation assurance regarding its internal 
controls (the request can also come from a user auditor). The service organisation then needs to 
commission independent assurance for its internal controls. The assurance report is then 
provided to the user organisation and, in some cases, to the public so that anyone can see the 
report.                   
Problems of agency and accountability can arise because of the greater complexity of this new 
form of organisational relationship, compared to the traditional relationship of a single agent and 
a single principal. This form of relationship raises the following issues regarding accountability 
in terms of both legal and social contractual relationships: 
- To whom are service organisations accountable?  
- To whom is the service auditor accountable? 
- Does the user organisation trust the service organisation, or the service auditor, so that it 
decides to use the services of the service organisation?  
- To which entity should shareholders / stakeholders give more trust?      
This introduces the paradox of accountability, because accountability based on agent-principal 
terms refers to the duty to provide an account of an agent’s actions for the principal, to whom the 
agent is responsible (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). Thus, the agent-principal framework assumes 
a narrow conception of accountability, which is pertinent to contractual agreements between the 
two parties. However, accountability can be variously defined as more inclusive of other 
stakeholders, or as pertinent to a “social contract” (Gray et al., 1988).     
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The next section provides a brief introduction to non-financial assurance and assurance for 
service organisations as a part of non-financial assurance practice. This will be linked to the trust 
produced by assurance providers and assurance reports for other parties.    
 
2.2 Non-financial Voluntary assurance and trust    
The extent to which entities engage in voluntary non-financial assurance practices is apparent 
through the increasing risks that organisations are facing in the new business 
environmentimportance of non-financial information; and increasing number of such assurance 
services and assurance statements accompanying various kinds of non-financialcorporate reports. 
It might be assumed that the increasing amount of non-financialcorporate reports and assurance 
statements indicate that more organisations are being held accountable for the impacts of their 
operations on related stakeholders (Swift, 2001).  
Assurance for service organisations is considered as one of the non-financialvoluntary assurance 
practices, but services related to because this practice areit is largely unregulated. One of the 
main issues for non-financialthese assurance services is expertise in specific subject matters 
relevant to a particular practice. However, the main aim of the assurance remains the same as for 
financial assurance, which is to increase the relevance and reliability of the assured non-financial 
information (Elliott, 1977).      
Barrett and Gendron (2006) and Gendron and Barrett (2004), for example, look at how e-
commerce assurance, called WebTrust, is developed to enhance digital trust in the clients’ 
websites. These studies show the attempts of assurance providers to develop this voluntary non-
financial assurance service and to persuade reporting organisations operating in such 
environment to engage with their services. Understanding that the roles played by assurance 
providers reflect how they serve, and are responsible to, different stakeholders (Power and 
Terziovski, 2007), allows the purpose of the assurance to be inferred. Power (1996) discusses 
three types of non-financial audits, quality audit, research audit, and brand audit, in order to 
understand the logic of auditability and the creation of an audit environment. Something is 
perceived to be auditable if it creates a network of trust and an auditability environment. Audit 
methodologies are believed to work because they are institutionally accepted through the process 
of negotiation of audit expertise. Subjects that are perceived as unauditable could become 
auditable at a later period because the network of trust and the auditability environment has been 
created around them (Power, 1996).    
Knolmayer and Asprion (2011) discuss the assurance practices for IT subcontracting and cloud 
computing. They call more attention to controls over privacy of non-financial data, and the need 
for increasing regulation on the IT outsourcing, especially in the business environment where 
cyber security issues are prevalent. As the relevant assurance practices for IT outsourcing have 
been changed from audit function (SAS70) to attestation function (ISAE3402 / SSAE 16) 
(Bierce and Kenerson, 2010), this nature of assurance practice might decrease the level of 
comfort and trust from the users of this kind of assurance reports (Knolmayer and Asprion, 2011, 
pp.32). Still, the main function of assurance practice, whether it is audit or attestation, is to create 
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trust on the audited subjects. In the digital age where cyber security is one of the major concerns 
for every organisation and their stakeholders, digital trust in such environment needs to be built 
and maintained. Thus, assurance might be needed for such purposes.  
As there are a number of assurance practices and assurance standards that can be related to IT 
outsourcing and cyber security, this paper focuses on a particular assurance practice called 
assurance for service organisations because this assurance practice relates to the broader business 
environment where companies outsource their particular functions, and also to IT governance of 
the outsourcing and service organisations.  
Ferguson and Pündrich (2015) have conducted a study to consider whether industry 
specialisation with respect to assurance for non-financial information matters to investors. There 
is weak evidence to suggest that changes in share prices around non-financial disclosures are 
influenced by specialist assurance providers. This shows that industry specialisation for non-
financial information does not matter to the investors in the absence of the risk of litigation. This 
means, for assurance of service organisations, which is not mandatory but may be subject to a 
litigation risk, specialist assurance providers can impact on investors’ and other stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the credibility of disclosed information.  
The following section introduces related assurance standards used for assurance engagements for 
service organisations.       
 
2.3 Assurance for service organisations: Assurance standard ISAE 3402 and 
SSEA 16  
There are two dominant assurance standards from professional accounting bodies that are largely 
used for assurance engagements for service organisations. These are International Standard 
on Assurance Engagements 3402 (ISAE 3402), Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service 
Organization (IAASB, 2010), and Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 16 
(SSAE 16), Reporting on Controls at a Service Organization (AICPA, 2016). ISAE 3402 is 
developed by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and SSAE 161 is developed by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  
These two standards are assertion-based standards, meaning that they require the management of 
the service organisations (i.e. the audited organisations) to provide a written assertion regarding 
relevant controls and procedures. The main difference between ISAE 3402 and SSAE 16 is that 
they are used by companies in different regions. ISAE 3402 has become the preferred standards 
for non-US companies, while SSAE 16 has been widely used by firms in the US. However, it is 
said that the development of SSAE 16 has been adjusted based on the requirements in ISAE 
3402; therefore, there is little difference between the two assurance standards (Chuprunov, 
2013). 
                                                           
1
 The AICPA first launched SSAE 16 to replace Statement on Auditing Standards No. 70 (SAS 70). 
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ISAE 3402 is arguably the most used subject-specific international standard for assurance 
reporting for investment managers and for internal controls over financial reporting (Assure UK, 
2017). In the UK, ISAE 3402 is largely used together with the guidance produced by the Audit 
and Assurance Faculty (AAF) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW), AAF 01/06, to give assurance over financial controls of third-party pension 
administrators. Whilst the assurance framework is subject to much debate, many of these reports 
are currently produced in accordance with the explicit guidance, AAF 01/06. They are 
commonly referred to as ‘Assurance Report on Internal Controls (AAF 01/06)’. 
ISAE 3402 identifies five primary responsibilities of service organisations. These include: 1) 
preparing and presenting a complete and accurate description of their internal control 
frameworks; 2) specify the control objectives; 3) identifying the risks relating to the control 
objectives; 4) designing, implementing and maintaining controls; 5) providing a written assertion 
to accompany the description as to the completeness and accuracy of the information provided 
and stating the criteria used as a basis for making the assertion (IAASB, 2010). 
For ISAE 3402, the focus is mainly on the services that affect internal controls relating to 
financial reporting. There is a distinction between two types of ISAE 3420 assurance reports. 
Type 1 – provides a report on the description and design of controls in a service 
organisation; 
Type 2 – provides a report on the description, design and operating effectiveness of 
controls in a service organisation. 
This means the auditor issuing Type 1 report aims to express their opinion on whether the 
controls are fairly presented and designed to achieve specific goals at a specific point in time. For 
Type 2 report, the auditor needs to express their opinion on the same issues stated for the Type 1 
report, and the operating effectiveness of the tested controls during a specific period. The 
auditor, hence, need to provide the results of the tests. Thus, the type of this assurance report 
may depend on the need of the audited organisations, and their agreement with the service 
auditors. However, Type 2 reports are more prevalent as it involves more extensive testing by 
service auditors.  
ISAE 3402 reports were mainly used in the asset management and pension administration 
industry until 2008. Since then, the demand for ISAE 3402 has expanded to the financial market 
with financial institutions like real estate management, hosting providers, and credit management 
institutions demanding ISAE 3402 assurance engagements (ISAE 3402.co.uk, 2014). 
The guidance for SSAE 16 has two major elements, which are the SSAE 16 standard itself and 
the related guide, titled “Service Organizations – Applying SSAE No. 16, Reporting on Controls 
at a Service Organization”. Also the trust service principles (TSP) are used as criteria for 
evaluation. The criteria included in the TSP are security, availability, processing integrity, 
confidentiality, and privacy. 
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For SSAE 16, there are three distinct types of service organisation control report (or assurance 
for service organisations): 
1. SOC 1 Report – provides information to management of service organisations, user 
organisations, user auditors, and related regulators on the internal controls that affect user 
organisations’ financial statements. The distribution of the report is restricted. ISAE 3402 
is an international equivalent to SOC 1. The SOC 1 assessment was actually developed 
from this standard, but differs from it slightly. 
2. SOC 2 Report – provides information to management of service organisations, user 
organisations, user auditors, and related regulators on non-financial controls that affect 
data security, privacy, availability, confidentiality and processing integrity (collectively 
called trust service criteria). The report verifies the application and implementation of 
controls. 
3. SOC 3 Report – provides information to the public on non-financial controls and verifies 
whether the controls that are applied and implemented are effective in achieving their 
selected objectives. This report only contains management’s assertion that they have met 
the requirements of the chosen criteria and the auditor’s opinion on this assertion. 
Hence, ISAE 3402 reports (both Type 1 and Type 2) can be matched with SOC 1 report as they 
focus “on the controls at a service organization that provides a service to user entities that is 
likely to be relevant to user entities’ internal control as it relates to financial reporting” (IAASB, 
2010, pp.323). 
As depicted in Figure 1 in Section 2.1 that Tthe commissioners of this kind of assurance 
engagement are generally service organisations. However, it may be the case that a user entity 
commissions an auditor to conduct this kind of assurance on the service organisation, if they 
have specific requirements (ISAE 3402.co.uk, 2014). The former case happens when service 
organisations want to demonstrate their internal control efficiency and to assure potential clients 
about the security of their systems. Also, they might commission the assurance to respond to a 
specific request from the related user entity or the user entity’s auditor as illustrated in the 
process 5.1 and 5.2 in Figure 1. The latter case happens when a user organisation has specific 
requirements and wants to make sure that the service organisations they are using, or will be 
using, have appropriate controls over their internal systems in place. It is worth noting that all 
these differences (e.g. assurance standards, types of assurance rep rts, and commissioners of 
assurance engagement) so that different purposes and requirement of specific assurance 
engagement can be highlighted. two kinds of assurance engagement for service organisations are 
different because the commissioners, report users, and related stakeholders may be different, 
hence highlighting different purposes of this kind of assurance engagement.   
3. Research framework 
This paper adopts the notion of accountability to make sense of organisational relationships in 
the context of assurance practice for service organisations, as accountability can be a proxy for 
trust, to assure that one party is accountable for their duty towards another party (Swift, 2001). 
Swift (2001) highlights two conceptualisations of trust that can be related to two kinds of 
accountability.    
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The first conceptualisation is based on the traditional agent-principal view that trust occurs 
between two parties. The actions of an agent are driven by self-interest and opportunism; 
therefore, it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing, which 
creates a risk for principals, particularly when there is high information asymmetry in favour of 
agents and goal conflicts among members (Eisenhardt, 1989). This influences the principal to 
believe that the agent will pursue self-interest, so the assumption is based on distrust. Trust here 
refers to “confidence expectation based upon predictability of agent’s behaviour” (Zucker, 1986 
as cited in Swift, 2001). As distrust is a basis for the call for accountability and is fundamental to 
the agent-principal assumption, the continuum of trust has distrust on one end, and lack of 
distrust on the other. Here, trust refers to predictability. This degree of predictability (or trust) 
can be enhanced by the use of accountability enhancing tools, such as assurance by independent 
third parties, regulations or related legislation.      
This conceptualisation of accountability and trust is normally based on two parties that have a 
contractual agreement (i.e. agent and principal). Problems between the two parties arise when 
one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The issue 
of accountability and trust becomes more complicated for new organisational forms, where there 
might be more than one agent and / or principal, so that the process of holding the agent(s) 
accountable involves more than one control relationship (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). This 
includes the operating environment where a service organisation or outsourcing is involved, 
because responsibilities are (directly or indirectly) delegated to parties other than the agent. 
Thus, the second conceptualisation of trust is useful for understanding this complex relationship. 
Trust here can also refer to “confident expectation based upon agent’s goodwill” (Ring and Van 
de Ven 1992 as cited in Swift, 2001). Trust, therefore, can also represent reliance or confidence. 
With this definition of trust, two parties are considered interdependent. This richer concept of 
trust takes into account mutual risks for all involved parties. The continuum of trust in this 
conceptualisation has trust on one end, and lack of trust on the other.     
Figure 2 shows the two ways to conceptualise trust as discussed above. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
‘compliance-based accountability’ as a proxy for the distrust and lack of distrust continuum, 
while Figure 2.2 illustrates ‘reputation-based accountability’ as a proxy for the lack of trust and 
trust continuum.    
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Figure 2: Accountability as a proxy for trust. 
 
These split continua of trust portray two kinds of accountability, one based on predictability of 
agents’ actions and the other based on a relationship of interdependency among the involved 
parties, are useful as lenses to understand the purpose of assurance practice as an accountability 
mechanism.   
The analysis and discussion is based on the characteristics of assurance reports (or SOC reports), 
online news and articles. From this evidence, the accountability of user organisations and service 
organisations, and trust among related stakeholders, can then be inferred.     
The discussion which follows in the next section represents a contextualisation of the 
aforementioned textual sources using the framework of accountability discussed previously in 
section 2, in order to examine the purpose of assurance engagements for service organisations. 
The analysis draws on the work of Swift (2001) to discuss the use of assurance reports as 
accountability and trust making mechanisms, in particular in the context of entities using service 
organisations. 
4. Example cases: assurance statements for service organisations  
Unlike other assurance statements included in annual reports or other forms of corporate report 
(e.g. assurance for sustainability reports), this kind of assurance report needs to be specifically 
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searched for, and there is no database that collectively stores these assurance statements. Also, 
some types of assurance reports, as mentioned in Section 2.3, are not publicly available. Drawing 
on the analysis of a large group of reports is difficult due to this lack of access.  
Thus, about 20 assurance reports relating to assurance for service organisations are examined. 
These are supported by additional information from news reports, professional service providers’ 
websites, blogs, and other related online sources. In this paper, although assurance standards are 
used as a way to categorise assurance reports, the distinction between reports based on ISAE 
3402 and SSAE 16 has not been made explicitly and extensively in the empirical cases because 
the focus is generally on the purpose of the assurance report (or SOC report). The analysis 
includes publicly available reports / assurance statements based on both ISAE 3402 and SSAE 
16.        
 
4.1 ISAE 3402 Assurance Report 
The full assurance reports for the assurance engagements for service organisations based on 
ISAE 3402 are not normally disclosed to the public. However, service organisations publicise the 
fact that they have commissioned independent assurance providers to examine and assess their 
control systems. Full assurance reports can also be requested by current or prospective clients.   
Figure 3: Excerpt from Rackspace’s website.  
 
(Source: https://www.rackspace.com/en-gb/certifications/isae-3402-type-ii-service-organization-control-soc2-reporting-uk (Rackspace, 2017)) 
From the statement included on the website of Rackspace, a cloud computing service provider 
(see Figure 3), it can be seen that this service organisation promotes the fact that they have had 
an independent third party evaluate their internal controls to ensure their effectiveness. They 
have also included the assurance standards used in the statement, and brief details about the 
assured areas of their services. However, they did not mention the name of their service auditor 
in the statement. 
A similar scenario is seen with Clearstream Banking Luxembourg, a securities services provider. 
The assurance report is available to only ‘premium users’. However, the service organisation has 
Page 12 of 41Managerial Auditing Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Managerial Auditing Journal
 
also added a description of the assurance standard used for the assurance engagement (see Figure 
4).    
Figure 4: Excerpt from Clearstream Banking Luxembourg’s website. 
 
(Source: http://www.clearstream.com/clearstream-en/about-clearstream/regulation--1-/isae-report (Clearstream Banking Luxembourg, 2017)) 
Another company, Nmbrs, which provides cloud HR and payroll software, also publicises the 
commissionin of a service auditor to conduct an assurance engagement based on ISAE 3402, and 
states the purpose of the ISAE 3402 report. Still, the report is only available for the users of their 
services upon request, or at their Amsterdam office.    
Figure 5: Excerpt from Nmbrs’ website I. 
 
(Source: http:// https://www.nmbrs.com/nl/isae-3402 (Nmbrs, 2017)) 
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Figure 6: Excerpt from Nmbrs’ website II. 
 
(Source: http:// https://www.nmbrs.com/nl/isae-3402 (Nmbrs, 2017)) 
Limitations in access to assurance reports might be a way to limit reputation-based 
accountability because the name of service auditor is not exposed to the public, but only to 
limited groups of report users. Similarly, service organisations can limit their accountability to 
users of their services (i.e. user organisations). However, their actions or internal control 
mismanagement can also indirectly affect the shareholders and / or stakeholders of user 
organisations.   
One of the reasons that service organisations do not disclose assurance reports may be that they 
need consent from the service auditor to share these reports with other parties. The following 
section illustrates the kind of reports that are available via the internet. 
 
4.2 Publicly available ISAE 3402 reports with AFF 01/06  
There are some assurance reports for service organisations that are publicly disclosed. However, 
these reports are usually based on ISAE 3420 and on ICAEW Technical Release, AAF 01/06 
Assurance Reports on Internal Controls of Service Organizations Made Available to Third 
Parties. 
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Figure 7: Excerpt from KPMG’s assurance report in  
Barnett Waddingham LLP’s Assurance Report on Internal Controls 2013/2014. 
 
(Source: Barnett Waddingham LLP’s Assurance Report on Internal Controls 2013/2014 (Barnett Waddingham, 2014)) 
In the assurance statements by independent assurance providers for this kind of assurance 
practice, a ‘Use of Report’ section is usually included. Referring to Figure 7, an assurance report 
by KPMG for Barnett Waddingham LLP, a provider of actuarial, administration and consultancy 
services, KPMG allows the user organisation (i.e. Barnett Waddingham LLP) to share the report 
with other parties. However, there is a caveat limiting their responsibility to the management or 
members of reporting organisations. The sharing of this report with the public is only to inform 
the public that the user organisation has commissioned the service auditor to conduct the 
assurance.  
In this case, the users of the report might cannot be clearly or completely specifiedidentified. The 
service auditor might, therefore, need to add such a caveat to limit their potential liability from 
potential unknown stakeholder groups (e.g. different types of customers of Barnett Waddingham 
LLP). Unlike the case of financial audit practice, in which financial auditors usually address their 
reports to shareholders of companies, this service user auditor addresses the report to the 
management of the serviceuser organisation to limit their responsibility only to the management 
of the service organisation. One of the reasons for this might be that they cannot specify certain 
user groups of the report.     
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Unlike the statements in section 4.1, Figure 7X shows that the company discloses the 
information about who the service auditor is. This means the service auditor might be held 
accountable for their service by the users of this report. Even though they are not contractually 
accountable because they have addressed the assurance engagement to the user organisation and 
because have included a written statement limiting the use of the report and limiting their 
responsibility, they are still subject to public accountability due to their reputation as a service 
auditor.       
To access this report, potential users do not need to send a request, as is required for the reports 
in Figures 3 to 6. However, the report needs to be specifically searched for; it is not 
straightforward to find on the company’s website.   
There are cases in which service auditors may have some idea of who the users are. Figure 8 
shows an assurance report by Assure UK for RPMI Limited, a pension scheme service provider. 
This report is also based on ISAE 3402 and AAF 01/06; therefore, the report is available for 
public access. The section, ‘Use of Report’ is also included and is similar to the report in Figure 
7. However, the content about sharing the report is slightly different in that the service 
organisation has to ask permission from the service auditor to share the report.  
Figure 8: Excerpt from Assure UK’s assurance report in  
RPMI Limited’s Internal Control Assurance Report 2013/2014. 
(Source: RPMI Limited’s Internal Control Assurance Report 2013/2014 (RPMI, 2014)) 
The service auditor permits the sharing of this report to the Railways Pension Trustee Company 
Limited and the service organization’s clients. This shows that the service auditor certainly know 
about one group of report users. Still, the other groups including potential customers of the 
service organization can still access the report via the internet.     
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4.3 Publicly available SSAE16 and SOC 3 reports  
As mentioned in section 2.3, assurance engagements for service organisations in the US are 
usually based on SSAE 16 and are in the format of a service organisation control (SOC) report. 
The criteria for assurance assessment are based on the TSP. As mentioned before, a SOC 3 report 
is similar to a SOC 2 report; however, service organisations can distribute SOC 3 reports freely. 
A SOC 3 report only provides information about whether the service organisation has met the 
TSP criteria or not. The report is less detailed than SOC 1 and SCO 2 reports. Figures 9 to 11 
illustrate excerpts from SOC 3 reports for Amazon Web Service Inc, Google Inc, and Dropbox 
Inc. 
Figure 9: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017. 
 
(Source: Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organization Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017 (Amazon Web Services, 2017)) 
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Figure 10: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Google Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016. 
 
(Source: Google Inc’s Service Organization Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016 (Google, 2016)) 
Figure 11: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Dropbox Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016. 
 
(Source: Dropbox Inc’s Service Organization Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016 (Dropbox, 2016)) 
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It can be seen from these excerpts that the addressees of the assurance reports are still the 
management of the service organisations, unlike with financial audit reports. These reports begin 
with statements saying that the service auditors have examined assertions by the management of 
the service organisations to form their assurance opinions.       
These assurance engagements are assertion-based. Thus, users of assurance reports need to be 
aware of and to understand management assertions, as these assurance reports need to be used 
together with the assertions. However, assertion-based assurance engagements seem to provide 
better governance of controls as the management of service organisations possess primary 
responsibility over internal controls and criteria rather than assigning this responsibility to the 
service auditors (Jones and Iwasaki, 2011).  
Although Figures 9 to 11 show SOC 3 reports that are publicly available, there are other service 
organisations that may not allow direct access to assurance reports. For example, the SOC 3 of 
Microsoft was also available; however, access to the report can be gained only via a registered 
account. As the author has an individual user account with Microsoft, the SOC 3 report could be 
accessed. Figure 12 shows the pop-up message displayed when the author attempted to download 
the SOC 3 report. This shows that Microsoft’s SOC 3 report is only available to Microsoft 
customers.       
Figure 12: Screenshot from Microsoft Inc’s website. 
 
(Source: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/trustcenter/compliance/soc?downloadDocument=nli&documentId=f804ea5a-8846-486c-9d9f-
d72020a4e2d6 (Microsoft, 2017)) 
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Unlike the cases of Google Inc and Dropbox Inc, Microsoft asks users who want access to the 
SOC 3 report to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Thus, an excerpt of the report is not included 
in this paper. The content of Microsoft’s SOC 3 report is similar to that of the Google Inc and 
Dropbox Inc reports. Although the service auditor is a different firm, it is one of the Big 4 firms.   
Being a registered customer of Microsoft, the author also tried to download the SOC 2 report. 
The download was successful; however, access to the file was denied because the type of license 
held by the author, that of an individual customer, does not match the license requirements to 
view the file.   
Besides the commissioning of assurance engagements by service organisations, as illustrated 
above, there may be cases of user organisations themselves, if they have specific assurance 
requirements, commissioning assurance providers as the service auditors. However, the evidence 
for this is not clear because such reports cannot be found publicly. This is inferred from the 
description of the ISAE 3420 assurance standard on the website “ISAE 3402.co.uk” (ISAE 
3402.co.uk, 2014), which states that “[w]ithout a Service Auditor's Report, the user organization 
would likely have to incur additional costs in sending their auditors to the service organization to 
perform their procedures”.   
From the examples of assurance statements, access to this kind of assurance report is 
ubiquitously not straight forward for all stakeholders. Thus, questions about the purpose of 
assurance, and the accountability of different parties can be raised. Also, caveats regarding 
inherent limitations on the subject matters of assurance engagements (i.e. internal controls) may 
introduce questions and doubts about the value and relevance of the information in assurance 
reports (see Figure 13 as an example of such a statement).   
Figure 13: Excerpt II from EY’s assurance report for  
Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017. 
 
 
(Source: Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organization Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017 (Amazon Web Services, 2017)) 
This issue is also linked to questions about the frequency of assurance and sufficiency of the 
efforts of user organisations and service auditors to improve their ability to detect and resist 
cyber-attacks that may be caused by the vulnerability of internal controls in these service 
organisations. This also applies to the possibility and means of advancing assurance practice and 
service organisations’ efforts to prevent, resist and respond to real-time cyber security threats.   
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5. Public disclosure of the assurance and stakeholders’ trust 
The cases introduced show current assurance practice for service organisations. The main aim 
of assurance practice is to create trust in itself and trust in related parties (Power, 2003). Trust in 
service organisations is important for user organisations, while trust in user organisations is 
important for stakeholders.  In the context of information systems and data security, it is 
therefore important that service organisations and user organisations communicate the 
effectiveness of their internal controls to assure stakeholders about their plans for preventing and 
reacting to cyber security threats. Assurance reports on the effectiveness of service 
organisations’ internal controls are one of the communication tools for assuring stakeholders 
about this. However, the accessibility of such assurance reports is not straightforward. Access is 
usually limited to particular groups of users. This therefore raises questions about stakeholder 
communication and about the accountability of service organisations and their auditors to related 
stakeholders.  
As evidenced by assurance statements, service organisations have contract-based accountability 
to user organisations because user organisations are their direct commissioners. Also, service 
auditors have contract-based accountability to service organisations for the same reason. 
However, accountability beyond contractual agreement also needs to be considered in this case 
because stakeholders of user organisations at the same time can be stakeholders of service 
organisations. 
The empirical cases highlights the fact that assurance statements for service organisations mainly 
provide reputation-based, not contract-based, accountability between service auditors and user 
organisations; and between service organisations and user organisations’ stakeholders (who can 
also be service organisations’ stakeholders). Limited access to the assurance reports and limited 
responsibility of service auditors potentially decrease the degree of this reputation-based 
accountability. The findings reveal a potential accountability paradox regarding the role of 
assurance practice, as to whether it serves as a managerial tool to build trust or as an 
accountability mechanism for stakeholders. Current assurance practice seems to be failing to 
enhance this reputation-based accountability. In some cases, stakeholders do not even know the 
identities of related service organisations and related service auditors because of the lack of 
public disclosure.  
However, for some cases, reputation-based accountability is enhanced by the use of this 
assurance for service organisations. With acknowledgement that service organisations have their 
internal controls assured by independent third parties, stakeholders might have more trust in their 
systems, even though they do not have contractual-binding agreements with them. Also, the 
goodwill of service auditors, especially of the Big 4 firms, can enhance such trust because of 
their credibility and expertise as assurance providers (Hodge et al., 2009). 
Another concern relates to stakeholders who are not internet users, as these kinds of assurance 
reports are mainly available online. However, there are also stakeholder groups not using the 
internet that might potentially be affected by data security breaches due to the mismanagement of 
service organisations’ internal controls. An example of this is when a person makes a paper-
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based registration for a service, and the data is stored in a cloud system. How would service 
organisations and user organisations communicate this to these groups of stakeholders?   
According to the split continua of trust by Swift (2001) discussed in Section 3, the function of 
this assurance practice for service organisations can be divided into two broad aspects. On one 
hand, it can be treated as assurance mechanism that helps eliminate distrust between contractual 
parties. Thus, this kind of relationship forms a compliance-based accountability. On the other 
hand, the assurance practice seems to be merely additional disclosure of corporate information 
informing stakeholders that the organisation has this assurance in place. This information, about 
having the assurance but not publicly providing full details, can potentially create more trust 
without explicit contractual binding; therefore, the assurance in this case can represent 
reputation-based accountability.  
Limited accessibility of assurance reports and limited responsibility of service auditors bring into 
question the purpose of assurance practice as an accountability enhancement mechanism, 
especially for reputation-based accountability. Seeing the reports, knowing who the service 
auditors are, and reading the content of the reports provide more information to stakeholders and 
leads them to put their trust in auditors’ reputations. In order to create trust for both related 
organisation and the assurance practice, there is a need to develop better mechanisms to enhance 
stakeholder dialogue (Swift, 2001).  
With this, the purpose of assurance practice and assurance statements can be questioned as to 
whether they are accountability enhancement tools or serve other purposes. Are they purely a 
risk management tool for service organisations and / or another kind of consulting service 
provided by service auditors? Or are they purely marketing tools for service organisations? This 
is illustrated by a statement in the AICPA’s flyer that “[SOC 3] can be used in a service 
organization’s marketing efforts” (AICPA, 2014). In this case, the purpose of the assurance is 
focused on being a managerial tool to enhance stakeholders’ trust without any relation to their 
accountability.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper has been to provide an overview of assurance practice for service 
organisations as this assurance practice is important in the digital era, in which data security 
breaches and outsourcing activities are prevalent. The paper highlights issues relating to the 
accountability of this contemporary form of organisational relationship that may involve more 
than one party to be held accountable (e.g. user organisation, service organisation, and auditor). 
The accountability framework articulated by Swift (2001) provides a useful lens through which 
to conceptualise accountability in such an environment, which is based on contractual agreement 
and the goodwill of service organisations, user organisations and their auditors. 
The examples of assurance reports demonstrate limited access to such reports, limited 
contractual accountability to stakeholders of service auditors (which is common in non-
financialvoluntary assurance cases), and limited reputational accountability due to limited 
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disclosure of information. Also, assurance reports are addressed to service organisations instead 
of to the wider users of the reports. This means service auditors are contractually responsible for 
the service organisation only. Does this mean their role is to serve as business advisors or as 
guardians of public accountability (Humphrey and Moizer, 1990)?  
Generally, the benefit of assurance by an independent third party is primarily to enhance 
confidence in information for the benefit of users of this information or, as is the case in this 
paper, to provide confidence in specific internal controls of service organisations. Thus, 
assurance can serve as accountability tools to ensure the audited parties are accountable for 
their actions that can affect related stakeholders. This kind of assurance practice particularly 
benefits organisations operating in industries in which there has been increasing scrutiny by 
different stakeholder groups (Jones and Iwasaki, 2011). 
This highlights the nature of this kind of assurance in that it is more or less one-way 
accountability and communication that provides “rituals of verification” (Power, 1997) instead of 
fostering trust and accountability through genuine stakeholder dialogue. Assurance reports for 
service organisations can serve as a reputation-based trust mechanism helping clients or user 
organisations to choose their service providers. However, the current practice seems insufficient 
for other important purposes relating to accountability. 
The examples and analysis in this paper provide a brief overview of one of the assurance 
practices that is relevant to modern businesses which are prone to data security threats. Future 
research in this area is needed in order to understand the usefulness, trust, and accountability 
relating to these assurance practices. Research work engaging with report users, both 
individual and institutional, is necessary to understand the usefulness of, and the demand for, 
the assurance, as well as the trust in specific service organisations and assurance providers. 
This kind of research can inform the real purpose of assurance reports. Also, it is important for 
researchers to engage with service organisations to explore requests for these assurance reports 
from different stakeholders. This again can provide useful information about the purpose of 
and demand for the practice, whether it provides real value to stakeholders or is just another 
“ritual of verification” (Power, 1997).         
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Assurance for Service Organizations: Contextualizing Accountability and Trust  
Edits are in the paper – Edited as marked by the reviewer’s editorial changes  
Comments from the email/note: 
Needs a bit more connection in the text to issues of cyber assurance. For instance, assurance of 
software and hardware that will be used. This may be a bit more critical than just non-financial 
information assurance. 
I tried to make more connection to the cybersecurity issues and expand the limited/captured term of 
“non-financial reporting”. The paper mainly highlights the practice of assurance for service organisation 
in relation to the business environment where cyber security is prevalent. Thus, it is one form of 
preventive/assurance mechanism that relate to cyber security and (cyber) trust. I have added some text 
to address this comment, but I am not sure I fully address this point and improve the paper sufficiently 
in the direction that you want. Please kindly let me know what you think.      
Major Questions (from the attached review document):  
1) So the Type 1 and 2 reports do not deal with non-financial controls that SOC 2 reports do. Type 2 
reports seem to subsume Type 1 reports. Most organizations would seem to need Type 2 reports??? 
Correct?  
See the additional text in Section 2.3. You are right the Type 2 subsume Type 1 report. The choice of 
specific types of report depends on the need to organisations, and maybe recommendation and their 
discussion with the auditor. However, Type 2 reports are more prevalent as it provides more extensive 
testing by the service auditor. 
For ISAE 3402, Type 1 report includes auditor’s opinion a specific point in time on description and design 
of controls; while Type 2 report includes the issue in Type 1, please the test on operating effectiveness 
of controls over a specific period.  
ISAE 3402 (Type 1 and 2) cane be more closely matched with SOC 1 as they are dealing with the controls 
relevant to financial reporting; while SOC 2 engagement is based on the security, availability, processing 
integrity, confidentiality or privacy. These principles extend the concerns beyond financial reporting to 
include non-financial related controls.    
2) In regard to Ferguson and Pundrich could cybersecurity risk be related to litigatio ? Especially with 
the concern for data protection?  
No, they did not refer directly to cyber security and data protection. But it refers specifically to 
geological assurance experts to make the inference about the non-financial assurance and expertise of 
the auditor. They found that in the areas where litigation risks are absence, the expertise does not really 
play a big part.   
I have excluded the paper, rewritten the paragraph to be more related to the cyber security issues.  
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3) Could the discussion of section 2.3 be related to figure 1?  
Please see additional text in the paper. 
4) Though certain reports are not required to be disclosed and there is no contractual relationship – 
can’t service organizations disclose the information? If it is a public organization I can get their 
reports. For instance, I can get the GRI report.  
They (Public organisations) may have this kind of reports (e.g. ISAE 3402, SOC2), but there is not 
regulation enforcing them to disclose it. For the cases that I mentioned, companies limit the access to 
the assurance reports. One of the reasons might be that those reports might contain detailed 
information so they think limited access is better than open access because they can track to whom the 
information get exposed to. The genuine reasons for this might need to gain from interviews with them 
or their auditors to get more precise insights. That is why SOC 3 is specifically designed assurance report 
for public use, as it contains less detailed information than SOC 2 does.       
For GRI: I would say this is slightly different from GRI report in the way that GRI is voluntary ‘reporting’ 
framework, not assurance standards. A company can do GRI reporting with or without assurance 
engagement. Generally, when they have assurance report accompanying their GRI reports, they usually 
disclose the assurance opinion/report/statement. I was told by the sustainability/GRI report auditors 
from one of the Big4 firm here that sometimes companies chose not to disclose the assurance 
statements. One of the reasons might be that they get unfavorable/qualified opinion. As there is no 
regulation to provide such an assurance with the report; they chose not to disclose but explain that they 
are improving the process and skip the assurance this year.     
5) Are there penalties for disclosure of these reports to others? 
To my knowledge, there are no such penalties. See the answer for the previous question regarding why 
companies might not want to disclose the full report (but just disclose only the fact that they have 
commissioned the assurance engagement). Also, from the auditors’ point of view, they might want to 
limit the exposure of the report as well so that they can avoid the public assuming their responsibility 
(albeit they have put caveat in their report), and better manage the expectation gap.      
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Submission for Managerial Accounting Journal 
Special issue:  Cybersecurity Risks, Controls and Assurance 
Page 28 of 41Managerial Auditing Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Managerial Auditing Journal
Figure 1: Relationships between service organisations and other entities.  
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Figure 2: Accountability as a proxy for trust. 
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Figure 3: Excerpt from Rackspace’s website.  
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Figure 4: Excerpt from Clearstream Banking Luxembourg’s website. 
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Figure 5: Excerpt from Nmbrs’ website I. 
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Figure 6: Excerpt from Nmbrs’ website II. 
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Figure 7: Excerpt from KPMG’s assurance report in  
Barnett Waddingham LLP’s Assurance Report on Internal Controls 2013/2014. 
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Figure 8: Excerpt from Assure UK’s assurance report in  
RP I Limited’s Internal Control Assurance Report 2013/2014. 
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Figure 9: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017. 
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Figure 10: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Google Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016. 
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Figure 11: Excerpt from EY’s assurance report for  
Dropbox Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2015/2016. 
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Figure 12: Screenshot from Microsoft Inc’s website. 
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Figure 13: Excerpt II from EY’s assurance report for  
Amazon Web Services Inc’s Service Organisation Control (SOC) 3 Report 2016/2017. 
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